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This paper explores the impact of university funding reform on teaching quality competition. It shows that a graduate 
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as pure and income contingent loans do not. Fee autonomy for universities leads to results inferior to properly state 
controlled fees and can make the majority of students even worse off than a central student assignment system with 
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1 Introduction
Market-oriented reforms, like the implementation of tuition fees, have gained con-
siderable attention in the debate on higher education funding across Europe. In
recent years, tuition and/or substantial registration fees were introduced in a num-
ber of countries including Austria, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom (Eurydice, 2000). Similar developments are under way in other countries,
e.g. Germany.
According to their supporters, tuition fees serve a dual purpose:1 ﬁrst, they enhance
the eﬃciency of enrolment choices by making students more aware of the real cost
of their study. Second, they improve teaching quality by fostering university com-
petition for students. However, this requires that university budgets become highly
responsive to payments from their students. Consequently, demands for tuition fees
and university autonomy regarding fee levels and spending decisions often go hand
in hand.2
Maybe surprisingly, the theoretical work of these popular arguments is far from
comprehensive. In fact, the existing literature on competition in higher education
remains almost exclusively in the realm of either conventional funding in form of per
student grants (Del Rey, 2001; De Fraja and Iossa, 2002) or considers pure private
funding (Epple et al., 2003). Hence, it provides little insights on how changes in
educational funding aﬀect university competition and thus teaching performance.
It is the aim of this paper to try to shed some light on this issue. We develop
a simple model where two universities respond to the strategic incentives arising
from various funding schemes including the popular reform options of pure loan
schemes, graduate taxes and income contingent loans.3 We consider both university
autonomy and tuition fee regulation by a benevolent - that is, surplus-maximizing
- government. Students are heterogenous in ability and peer groups matter for the
teaching cost.
1These are by far not the only arguments in the debate. The long list of pros and cons of
governmental involvement in higher education includes reverse redistribution (Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa
and W¨ alde, 2000), social selection (Wigger and von Weizs¨ acker, 2001), second best arguments
(Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005) and public choice explanations (Bevi´ a and Iturbe-Ormaetxe, 2002).
2Greenaway and Haynes (2003) for the UK and German Rectors’ Conference (2005) for Germany
serve as illustrative examples in this context.
3Barr (1993) provides a good overview on ﬁnancing alternatives for higher education.University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 3
Our analysis leads to the following main results. First, we ﬁnd that uniform tuition
fees fail to achieve the welfare optimum. This holds because optimality requires a
diﬀerentiation of teaching qualities according to ability. However, quality choices
under uniform fees are homogenous because all universities face the same incen-
tives for quality enhancement. Indeed, uniform fees and student grants are de facto
equivalent if the latter are combined with free enrolment choice. Second, the opti-
mum can be implemented by a graduate tax with properly diﬀerentiated fees set by
the government. This funding mechanism outperforms all other considered options,
mainly because the graduate tax disposes of a higher number of policy instruments
to aﬀect individual and university decisions.
Obviously, optimality is lost when the government is guided by interests other than
surplus-maximization.4 Therefore, we investigate in a next step whether fee auton-
omy can serve as another device to achieve eﬃciency. As the third main result, we
ﬁnd this not to be the case which is basically due to excessive quality diﬀerentia-
tion under fee autonomy. While pure loans are superior to the graduate tax when
universities are autonomous, they are dominated by properly regulated uniform fees
or grants and can make the vast majority of students even worse oﬀ than a central
student placement system where teaching incentives are miniscule.
The two papers closest to our analysis are Epple and Romano (1998) and Eisenkopf
(2004).5 Epple and Romano (1998) study how education vouchers aﬀect competition
between public and private schools in a setting where only the latter charge tuition.
In contrast, we consider a setting where regulation aﬀects all universities equally,
which better ﬁts the European case of reforming a by and large public education
sector.
Eisenkopf (2004) analyses how university deregulation aﬀects the curriculum choice
of universities when higher quality implies higher risk of failure. Similar to the
present study, he ﬁnds that competition without autonomous fees leads to uniformity
while fee autonomy boosts incentives for quality diﬀerentiation. However, admission
regulation mitigates these incentives such that equilibrium quality choices may (but
need not) be symmetric. In our opinion, the main conceptual diﬀerence to our
approach lies in the university objective function. Eisenkopf (2004) assumes that
4We address the issue of other government objectives in the conclusions section.
5Moreover, Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2004) study optimal tuition policies for various university
objective functions. However, that model does not address competition between universities.4 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
universities act intrinsically in order to promote the social surplus. We take a more
sceptical stance in that respect, stressing that teaching involves opportunity costs
for some other activity of universities, which is labelled as research in our model.6
As a consequence, our analysis takes the above-mentioned link between competition
and teaching eﬀort explicitly into account. Other diﬀerences between the approaches
include the fact that we consider a variety of tuition fee options and examine their
welfare ramiﬁcations.7
The paper is organised as follows. After a presentation of the basics of the model and
the eﬃcient solution in Section 2, Section 3 investigates the working of centralised
student grant systems. Section 4 introduces tuition fees which are determined by
the government. Section 5 derives and compares the equilibria under university
autonomy. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Basics of the Model
Consider a set of individuals with their total mass normalised to unity. Born with
the same initial productivity, people diﬀer with respect to their learning capabil-
ities, measured by the probability of graduating from university θ ∈ [0,1]. For
convenience, we assume a uniform distribution of abilities/types: f(θ) = 1.
University attendance has two eﬀects. First, it increases the productivity and hence
the wage of a successful graduate by qi ≥ 0. For simplicity, the teaching quality
of institution i is also measured by qi. Second, mere university attendance gives
a positive beneﬁt ξ for all students, e.g. due to network eﬀects or a consumption
motive. Interpreting ξ in monetary terms, going to university i augments expected
gross income by:
θ(ξ + q) + (1 − θ)ξ = ξ + θq. (1)
As the result of an entrance examination, only the individuals with a success prob-
ability of at least θ ∈ (0,1) are allowed to study. Although it would be interesting
to investigate the interplay between standard setting and funding schemes, we take
θ as exogenous throughout the paper.
6Hence, incentives for quality diﬀerentiation are stronger in our model: For homogenous quality,
universities enjoy no rents for research, whereas they produce some social surplus.
7In turn, Eisenkopf (2004) explicitly incorporates student risk aversion and the eﬀects of ad-
mission regulation, two factors not considered here. See the conclusions section for a discussion.University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 5
In what follows, ξ is assumed to be so high that all individuals fulﬁlling the standard
θ prefer to attend university rather than working with the initial productivity level.
As a consequence, enrolment is rationed and the number of students is constant -
similar to Del Rey (2001) and Epple et al. (2003) - and amounts here to 1 − θ.8
There are two universities, i = 1,2, engaged in both teaching and research. Each
university is characterised by the target function:
πi = Ri + αqiNi, (2)
where Ri is the research budget, Ni is the number of registered students and α
measures the importance of teaching. Whenever quality diﬀerences arise, we refer
to university 1 as the high- and to university 2 as the low-quality institution: q1 ≥ q2.
We oﬀer two complementary explanations for α > 0. First, it can be interpreted
conventionally as an intrinsic motivation for teaching excellence (Del Rey, 2001; De
Fraja and Iossa, 2002). Second, it can reﬂect a spillover of teaching performance on
research productivity in the spirit of the Humboldtian ideal of the unity of teach-
ing and research. In this case, (2) should be regarded as a reduced form of these
interrelations since research spills over on teaching as well.
The per capita cost of teaching quality qi when students have average success prob-
ability ¯ θi is:
c(qi, ¯ θi) = γq
2
i − β¯ θi, β,γ > 0. (3)
The ﬁrst term measures the direct teaching cost which is strictly convex in quality.
The second term reﬂects the peer group beneﬁt, arising from the fact that students
are not only clients, but also inputs for university services (Rothschild and White,
1995). Therefore, the resources required to attain a given quality decrease in the
average ability of students.9 The intensity of this peer group eﬀect is measured by
β.
8Alternatively, ξ could reﬂect the productivity gain from a minimum teaching quality which
universities can not fall short of. In terms of the assumption on university quality setting in
Section 3, this would imply qi ≥ q > 0. Thus, the assumption on the level of ξ could be replaced
by an assumption on the government’s ability to control and restrict fund diversion. Provided that
universities have an incentive to choose at least q, all following results go through. Otherwise,
corner solutions would arise with at least one university providing the minimum teaching quality.
9This is a dual deﬁnition of peer group eﬀects to the conventional one where the ability of the
other students improves individual quality for given educational expenditures. See, e.g. Gary-Bobo
and Trannoy (2004) for a similar approach.6 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
In order to focus on the main insights of this approach, we impose two restrictions
on the parameters. First, we make the research-teaching tradeoﬀ severe in the sense
that universities care for research funds at least as much as for teaching: α ∈ [0,1].
Second, there is an upper bound on the peer group eﬀect excluding the case of
negative per capita teaching costs: β ≤ α2/(4γ) ≤ 1/(4γ).10 Each restriction is in
fact stronger than required for the following results to hold.
The optimal solution, which we now derive, maximises the surplus in the higher
education sector and serves a useful benchmark for later analysis. To focus attention
on teaching issues, we disregard beneﬁts from research other than captured in (2)
and posit that one unit of research consumes one unit of ﬁnancial resources. The
resulting equality of the marginal costs and beneﬁts of research renders the optimal
research budget indeterminate. As a consequence, welfare is determined only by
the teaching side.11 Letting ˆ θ denote the cut-oﬀ level of ability which generates the























with respect to q1,q2 and ˆ θ. This leads to the ﬁrst order conditions:
(1 − ˆ θ
2)/2 + (α − 2γq1)(1 − ˆ θ) = 0, (5)
(ˆ θ
2 − θ
2)/2 + (α − 2γq2)(ˆ θ − θ) = 0, (6)
(q1 − q2)[−α + γ(q1 + q2) − ˆ θ] R 0, (7)
where (7) holds with equality if ˆ θ ∈ (0,1).
10As shown below, universities choose a teaching quality of at least α/(2γ). When only the most
able students attend such an institution (¯ θi = 1), the per capita cost α2/(4γ) − β is positive only
under the above restriction.
11Otherwise, if an optimal research level existed but universities were underfunded, one could
argue that the diversion of student grants towards research improves welfare. However, this would
neglect that funds could also ﬂow towards other, non-productive activities.University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 7
Proposition 1. Eﬃcient higher education requires a diﬀerentiation of teaching
qualities according to ability: The brighter half of students (θ ≥ θ∗ = (1 + θ)/2)
should attend university 1 which provides quality q∗
1 = (3 + θ + 4α)/(8γ), while the
less able students ( θ < θ∗) should receive the lower quality q∗
2 = (1+3 θ +4α)/(8γ)
at university 2.
Proof. The ﬁrst-order conditions (5)-(7) are solved by both the values reported in
the proposition leading to the surplus
S
∗ = (1 − θ)

ξ +











and by the uniform solution q1 = q2 = (2 + 2 θ + 4α)/(8γ) and any ˆ θ ∈ [ θ,1].
However, this solution yields a surplus
S
U = (1 − θ)

ξ +











which is unambiguously lower than (8) because θ < 1. 
The superiority of quality diﬀerentiation originates in the variation of expected
marginal returns among individuals. Ideally, every student should receive the teach-
ing quality which equalises the expected individual marginal return and the marginal
cost. Therefore, it is advantageous to exploit the opportunity of oﬀering two dif-
ferent qualities rather than uniformity.12 As higher talented students are less likely
to fail, they yield higher expected returns and obtain a better quality. This holds
irrespective of the strength of peer group eﬀects. In fact, these eﬀects cancel out in
the aggregate – the gain in total productivity by one university is just oﬀset by the
loss of the other. As a consequence, peer groups matter for the surplus level, but
not for optimal quality and sorting.
3 Student Grants
The traditional form of higher education ﬁnancing, still applied in a number of
OECD countries (Fausto, 2002), is to transfer publicly funded grants directly to
12In principle, eﬃciency could be enhanced by increasing the number of universities further.
However, this gain would be reduced by an additional ﬁxed cost of setting up a new institution.
To simplify the analysis, we exclude this ﬁxed cost from the following analysis.8 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
universities. While details of funding regulations vary across countries, the heart of
the mechanism lies in the payment of a per-student grant t and a general/research
budget B to universities (Del Rey, 2001, De Fraja and Iossa, 2002). Like in Garc´ ıa-
Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde (2000), we assume that these expenditures are ﬁnanced by
a uniform tax T on all individuals. This formulation captures the well-reported
reverse redistribution of higher education funding, high lifetime income earners (the
graduates) being subsidised by the less well-oﬀ general taxpayer.
In addition to funding, a number of countries also regulates enrolment. For some
programs in Germany, for example, students have to apply to a central agency
which allocates candidates to universities according to a wealth of criteria. In the
present setup, such a central placement system implies: N1 = NCP
1 ,N2 = NCP
2 with
respective average success probabilities ¯ θCP
1 , ¯ θCP
2 .
Although the government imposes tight regulatory constraints, it is virtually unable
to monitor all spending decisions perfectly. Academic life oﬀers ample scope for
discretion, like the time spent for preparing lectures, staﬀ teaching loads or the
type and number of books ordered for the library. We take account of this fact by
allowing universities to decide on the level of educational quality, subject only to a
non-negativity constraint: qi ≥ 0. As a consequence, the problem of each institution
is to maximise B + (t + αqi − γq2
i + β¯ θi)Ni. For further reference, we call the term
in brackets the per student rent ri.
In this setup, central placement is inherently ineﬃcient: Maximising πCP
i = B +
(t + αqi − γq2
i + β¯ θCP
i )NCP
i with respect to qi gives qCP
i = α/2γ. Teaching qual-
ity results only from intrinsic motivation and/or research-enhancing eﬀects. All
available resources exceeding the concomitant teaching expenditures α2/(4γ)NCP
i
are redirected to research. To facilitate later comparisons, we assume that the
government grant covers exactly these minimal expenditures which requires a tax
T CP = α2/(4γ) · (1 − θ) on each individual. The respective surplus amounts to:13
S
CP = (1 − θ)

ξ +








13While this ﬁnding somehow mirrors the popular complaints about poor teaching quality in
state-run university systems, it should be emphasised that universities would also divert resources
from research to teaching if the latter was underfunded (t < α2/(4γ)).University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 9
The ineﬃciency of central placement is an outright consequence of the poor incen-
tives for universities to attract students. This problem can be addressed by allowing
students to select their preferred institution. In that case, enrolment results from





1 − θ : qi > qj
(1 − θ)/2 : qi = qj
0 : qi < qj
. (11)
If universities diﬀer, all students attend the better one, and enrolment is random
when both institutions are identical. In either case, the average student ability is
¯ θi = (1 + θ)/2. Therefore, the combination of student grants and free enrolment
choice induces university i to maximise B +(t+αqi −γq2
i +β¯ θi)Ni, with respect to
qi, where Ni is given by (11). This leads to reaction functions:
qi(qj) =

    
    
α/(2γ) : qj < α/(2γ)
qj + ε : α/(2γ) ≤ qj < ˆ q(t,(1 + θ)/2)
q ≤ ˆ q : qj = ˆ q(t,(1 + θ)/2)
q ≤ qj − ε : qj > ˆ q(t,(1 + θ)/2)
, (12)
where:






2 + 4γt + 4βγ¯ θi
4γ
2 , (13)
denotes the quality level for which the grant t equals the net per student loss in
research funds when average ability is ¯ θi.14
In economic terms, each university has an incentive to attract all students whenever
the per student rent is positive. As a consequence, universities ﬁnd themselves in a
tight Bertrand-like competition with equilibrium teaching qualities:
q
SC
1 (t) = q
SC




depending on the level of the grant.
14Strictly speaking, ε in (12) is an arbitrarily small indivisible unity, say a cent, and quality is a
multiple of that unit. As shown by Osborne (2004, p. 66), the best-reply correspondences of the
Bertrand-type game played here are not well deﬁned when the choice variable is continuous. The
following analysis sticks to the continuous rather than a discrete formulation of the problem for
the sake of expositional brevity.10 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
Allowing students to select their institution establishes a link between university
revenue and teaching performance and consequently enhances educational quality
relative to central assignment. Moreover, the competition for students prevents
the diversion of teaching grants for research purposes. However, optimality is not
attained. Maximising (4) with respect to t under consideration of (14), gives the op-
timal grant with free student choice (SC): tSC =
(1+ θ)2−4α2+8βγ(1+ θ)
16γ , which implies








equals (9) and is therefore lower than S∗. This ineﬃciency is rooted in the tight com-
petition inducing both universities to oﬀer equal teaching qualities. This precludes
both eﬃcient diﬀerentiation and student sorting.
4 Tuition Fees
In a sense, the eﬃciency problems of the latter mechanism originate now in the
incentives of students: in the absence of ﬁnancial involvement, quality but not cost
matters for enrolment. Tuition fees are an obvious corrective.
The recent discussion about university funding reform centers around three reform
proposals (see, e.g. Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde (2000)): the pure loan scheme,
the graduate tax and income contingent loans. While all alternatives share the
provision of a governmental loan covering the fee fi, they diﬀer signiﬁcantly in
terms of repayment facilities. A pure loan scheme regime requires students to pay
back their loan irrespective of educational success. In the present model, this implies
the lifetime income: ξ + θqi − fi. The graduate tax scheme, in contrast, subsidises
some fraction ρ of the fee, which is ﬁnanced by a tax T GT on the successful students
only. Expected student income is thus: ξ + θ(qi − T GT) − (1 − ρ)fi. Thence,
the pure loan scheme is equivalent to a graduate tax with a zero subsidy. Finally,
income contingent loans exempt unsuccessful students from fee repayment and cover
the resulting deﬁcit by a general tax. Under this alternative, expected income is:
ξ + θ(qi − fi) − T IC.
Like Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde (2000), we consider a fundamental funding reform
where fees cover the entire higher education budget. Hence, the ﬁscal status of theUniversity Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 11
system need not improve relative to the status quo.15 This is mostly for simplicity.
As can be seen below, the existence of additional grant elements has no eﬀect on
student decisions.
For uniform fees (f1 = f2), all three regimes have identical implications for teaching
quality. This holds because students continue to enrol according to (11): with
equal eﬀective attendance cost across universities, decisions depend only on teaching
quality. Consequently, uniform tuition fees replicate the equilibrium under free
students’ choice and a grant equal to the fee level, and therefore do not produce
any eﬃciency gain over grants. In particular, they fail to generate the required
diversity. Hence, any superiority of tuition fees over student grants must originate
in the possibility to diﬀerentiate prices.16
With non-uniform fees, enrolment choices become dependant on repayment facilities.
Under the pure loan scheme, ˜ θPL, the student type indiﬀerent between attending













All students with a higher success probability attend university 1: NPL
1 = 1 − ˜ θPL
whereas the less able go to university 2: NPL
2 = ˜ θPL − θ. Average abilities are
¯ θPL
1 = (1 + ˜ θPL)/2, ¯ θPL
2 = (˜ θPL + θ)/2.













whereas under income contingent loans, students focus on the earnings-fee diﬀeren-







1 − θ : qi > qj − fj + fi
(1 − θ)/2 : qi = qj − fj + fi
0 : qi < qj − fj + fi
. (18)
15Sometimes, the deﬁnition of the above alternatives is linked to their revenue eﬀects, see, e.g.,
Department of Education and Skills (2004a).
16Using diﬀerentiated instead of uniform grants would not be helpful because student decisions
would still be governed by quality concerns only.12 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
Proposition 2. With centrally administered tuition fees, neither pure nor in-
come contingent loans implement the eﬃcient solution. However, eﬃciency can be
achieved by a graduate tax for a proper choice of the subsidy rate and diﬀerentiated
fee levels.
We relegate the somewhat cumbersome proof to the Appendix and focus here on
the economic forces behind the result. Income contingent loans fail due to the lack
of student sorting because enrolment decisions do not depend on ability. The inef-
ﬁciency of pure loans originates in the dual task of tuition fees: on the one hand,
they must ensure optimal teaching by rewarding universities with the marginal social
beneﬁt of quality enhancements. On the other hand, they have to achieve eﬃcient
student sorting by equalising absolute private beneﬁts across universities for the
correct cut-oﬀ ability. The latter task is not concomitant to the other two, which
renders a proper control of all three variables q1,q2 and ˜ θ by just two instruments
f1 and f2 impossible.17 However, the graduate tax disposes of an additional instru-
ment, the subsidy rate. Inﬂuencing student enrolment without aﬀecting university
behaviour, it can be adjusted to replicate the eﬃcient solution.18
5 University Autonomy
We now explore whether the optimal solution can be decentralised by giving univer-
sities the right to set tuition fee levels. Our motivation for this analysis is twofold.
On the one hand, the above optimality result hinges crucially on the existence of a
benevolent government or regulator, which is clearly a disputable assumption. On
the other hand, it is useful to assess the consequences of the observed policy trend
towards equipping universities with more autonomy, including fees.19
In order to capture all strategic interactions, universities are assumed to anticipate
how quality choices aﬀect fee setting incentives. Therefore, we consider a three
17Note that this problem cannot be resolved by simply assigning students to universities, as this
would destroy universities’ teaching incentives.
18In the two university case considered here, a uniform subsidy restores eﬃciency. For a higher
number of universities, eﬃcient diﬀerentiation is likely to require a non-linear subsidy scheme.
19See, e.g., Department of Education and Skills (2004b) for the UK, German Rectors’ Conference
(2005) for Germany and European Commission (2004) for the Netherlands. Italian universities
enjoy some fee autonomy since 1993 (European Commission, 2004).University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 13
stage game: at stage 1, universities announce their teaching qualities. Then, at
stage 2, they set the respective tuition fees. Finally, students decide on attendance
at stage 3. Due to the complexity of the analysis, we derive the equilibria under
either proposal successively.
5.1 Pure Loans
Under the pure loan scheme, students enrol according to (16) at stage 3. Anticipating
this, universities choose tuition fees at stage 2 in order to maximise: αqiNi + B +
(fi + β¯ θPL
i − γq2




















i = 0. (19)
The decision on the fee level is determined by trading oﬀ three eﬀects. First, in-
creasing fi generates a higher payment from all enrolled students (NPL
i ). Second,
some students switch over to the competitor (
∂NPL
i
∂fi = −1/(q1−q2) < 0). This loss is




∂fi interact multiplicatively). Third, the change in average student quality
decreases the quality cost for university 1, but increases it for university 2.
Solving (19) for fi as a function of qualities and the marginal student type yields:20
fi = γq
2
i − αqi + N
PL
i (q1 − q2) − β˜ θ
PL. (20)
For given qualities, the peer group eﬀect impinges on the tuition fees of both insti-




∂β < 0). For university 2, a stronger
peer group eﬀect accentuates the decrease of both enrolment and average ability.
For university 1, however, there are two countervailing eﬀects, a cost reduction from
a better student composition and a lower number of students on whom the cost can
be saved. The latter eﬀect dominates.
Inserting the resulting fee diﬀerential:
f1 − f2 = (q1 − q2)
h
1 + α − 2˜ θ
PL − θ + γ(q1 + q2)
i
(21)
















.14 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
into (16) gives the indiﬀerent student:
˜ θ
PL(q1,q2) =
1 − θ + α + γ(q1 + q2)
3
. (22)
Enrolment at university 1 decreases not only in the quality provided by university
2, but also in the own quality. This holds because an increase of q1 implies a
disproportionate rise of the fee due to the strict convexity of direct quality cost.
Hence, the fee diﬀerential widens and some students move to university 2.
Inserting (22) into (20) leads to the equilibrium fees:
fi(qi,qj) =





β(1 − θ + α)
3
, (23)
and per student rents fi + αqi − γq2








= [2(q1 − q2) + β,2(q1 − q2) − β]. (24)
A stronger peer group eﬀect increases the rent for university 1, but decreases it for
university 2. Moreover, the rents for both universities rise in the quality diﬀerential,
because students become less responsive to fee increases.
At stage 1, universities set qualities, taking the implications for enrolment and
research rents into account. However, (24) shows that these eﬀects have opposite
signs for both institutions. According to the ﬁrst-order conditions, improving quality
at university 1 reduces attendance but increases the per capita rent, whereas a higher
quality at university 2 attracts more students, but decreases the per capita rent:
∂π1
∂q1
= (2 − θ + α − γ(q1 + q2)) − 2(β + γ(q1 − q2)) = 0, (25)
∂π2
∂q2
= (1 − 2 θ − α + γ(q1 + q2)) + 2(γ(q1 − q2) − β) = 0. (26)
Proposition 3. With autonomous universities, the pure loan scheme implies a
diﬀerentiation of equilibrium teaching qualities and tuition fees. However, the ag-
gregate social surplus is suboptimal: university 2 underprovides quality, whereas the
quality of university 1 can be either ineﬃciently high or low. Moreover, enrolment
at university 1 is excessive.University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 15







5 − θ + 4(α − βγ)
8γ
,












































with F PL = (16α2 − 58 θ)/(64γ) − β(168 + 120 θ − 112βγ)/192. Comparing these





β Q (1 − θ)/(2γ). Moreover, NPL
1 > N∗
1 for β > 0. The total surplus of the pure











This equilibrium has a familiar interpretation in terms of the maximum diﬀerenti-
ation principle known from the vertical product diﬀerentiation literature (Shaked
and Sutton, 1982): The more equal the qualities, the ﬁercer the fee competition.
In the limit, if both institutions oﬀered the same quality, only the cheaper one
would attract students and rents would be zero. In order to avoid this, universities
diﬀerentiate and obtain a per student rent to be diverted towards research.21
While peer group eﬀects do not aﬀect these general incentives, they lead to two
additional ﬁndings. First, a higher β reduces equilibrium qualities, but leaves the
absolute quality diﬀerential unaﬀected. This is due to the uniform negative impact
of β on both tuition fees for any quality combination, see (20). Hence, peer group
eﬀects aggravate the ineﬃciency of the low quality institution and impinge on the
quality incentives for university 1, such that pervasive underprovision can result.22
This stands in some contrast to the usual ﬁndings of the vertical diﬀerentiation
literature. Second, peer group eﬀects encourage enrolment at university 1, which
is caused by the strict convexity of the direct quality cost function. Hence, the
uniform reduction of both qualities by the same amount caused by increasing β
brings about higher cost savings and hence a higher fee reduction at university 1
21Some support for this result is provided by Hoxby (1997) who ﬁnds that competition among
American universities has increased both product diﬀerentiation and tuition fees.
22Depending on the parameter constellation, quality at university 1 can even be lower than the
optimal quality for low ability students: qPL
1 ≷ q∗
2 ⇐⇒ β ≶ (1 − θ)/γ.16 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
than at university 2. As a consequence, the fee diﬀerential narrows and the ability
of the marginal student decreases.
Comparing pure loans with alternative ﬁnancing schemes, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 4. The pure loan scheme with university autonomy leads to a higher
social surplus than central placement. However, central placement may make some
or even all students may be better oﬀ.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result highlights that the eﬃciency gains arising from the implementation of
the pure loan scheme are very unequally distributed. In particular, students of
minor ability face a higher ﬁnancing burden, but only a weak improvement or even
a deterioration in quality:23 When student heterogeneity is high, diﬀerentiation











(α − βγ). (27)
Proposition 5. Optimally administered uniform grants tSC make universities
worse and students as a whole better oﬀ than pure loans under university autonomy.
Moreover, the surplus under pure loans is lower.
Proof. The surplus diﬀerential amounts to SPL − SSC = −β2γ(1 − θ)/24 − 3(1 −
θ
2)/(64γ) < 0. Universities enjoy no rents under uniform fees, so they must be
better oﬀ under pure loans. However, the total surplus is lower, which implies that
students as a whole must be worse oﬀ. 
In the present setting, the eﬀect of relaxing fee competition by means of quality dif-
ferentiation is so strong that students as a whole would not proﬁt from substituting
properly administered grants for pure loans with fully autonomous universities.
23It is easy to establish that the utility decrease of low ability students is not driven by the
removal of reverse redistribution. For α = 0, central placement grants and hence the tax are zero.
Nevertheless, a signiﬁcant number of students can be worse oﬀ under pure loans.University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 17
5.2 Graduate Tax
As argued above, the graduate tax proposal diﬀers from pure loans because of the
fee subsidy. The formal analysis run analogous to the one of the last subsection,








j) − β(1 + θ − (1 − ρ)α)
3
,
the indiﬀerent type is: ˜ θGT(q1,q2) = (1 − (1 − ρ)α + θ + (1 − ρ)γ(q1 + q2))/3 and








= [2(q1 − q2) + (1 − ρ)β,2(q1 − q2) − (1 − ρ)β].(28)
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24
. (29)
Proposition 6. With university autonomy, equilibrium qualities, tuition fees and
the quality diﬀerential are increasing in the subsidy rate of the graduate tax. Thus,
the graduate tax leads to higher teaching qualities than pure loans. However, the
surplus under any graduate tax is lower than under pure loans.
Proof. The eﬀects on equilibrium qualities and fees follow immediately from diﬀer-
entiating the above expressions. The quality diﬀerential qGT
1 −qGT
2 = (1− θ)/(2γ(1−
ρ)) increases unambiguously in ρ. The superiority of the pure loan scheme results
as follows. Diﬀerentiation of (29) with respect to ρ and evaluating for ρ = 0 gives:
∂SGT
∂ρ
   
ρ=0
= −
(1 − θ)[18(1 + θ)2 − βγ(28βγ + 12(1 + θ))]
96γ
< 0. (30)18 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
Hence, a marginal subsidy reduces the surplus. Although SGT need not be concave
in ρ, it can be shown that ∂SGT2
∂ρ2 changes its sign at most once. As limρ→1 SGT = −∞,
SGT < SPL for all ρ ∈ (0,1]. 
The fee subsidy exempts students from some cost of their enrolment decision, which
implies the following eﬀects. On the one hand, university 1 attracts more students for
given qualities and fees (∂˜ θGT
∂ρ < 0). This induces university 2 to improve its quality.
On the other hand, students become less responsive to fee increases (
∂(˜ θGT)2
∂fi∂ρ > 0).
Therefore, a given quality diﬀerential allows both universities to charge higher fees
which boosts the incentives for quality diﬀerentiation. Consequently, university 1
increases quality by more than university 2. However, the concomitant fee increase




Moreover, increasing the subsidy has complex implications for the social surplus.
First, all students who choose university 2 anyway (θ < θGT) receive a higher quality.
This improves welfare by mitigating quality underprovision for these types. Second,
the rise of q1 increases or decreases the surplus from all students with θ ≥ ˜ θ∗,
depending on whether over- or underprovision prevails. Third, more resources are
spent on ineﬃciently poor talented university 1 students (θ ∈ [˜ θGT, ˜ θ∗)). While this
deteriorates welfare if qGT
1 > q∗
2, it is beneﬁcial when qGT
1 < q∗
2. However, in that
case another ineﬃciency arises because the students switching from university 1 to
university 2 get less quality. In the present setup, the negative eﬀects dominate so
the graduate tax gives inferior results to a pure loan scheme.
Figure 1 illustrates the welfare eﬀects of substituting a graduate tax for pure loans
when peer group eﬀects are small such that qPL
1 > q∗
1. Vertically shaded areas
indicate welfare gains, whereas losses arise in the horizontally shaded areas. For
this constellation, the quality improvement for those students choosing university
2 in the presence of a graduate tax is beneﬁcial, but the surplus generated by all
students who attend university 1 falls.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 19
5.3 Income Contingent Loans
Recently, a number of countries, including Australia and the UK, have introduced
elements of income contingent loans into higher education funding (Chapman, 1997,
Greenaway and Haynes, 2003). In contrast to the above proposals, this option leaves
the general taxpayer involved as the deﬁcit resulting from failing students is ﬁnanced
by a uniform tax T IC.
Faced with the two quality/fee oﬀers at stage 3, students choose universities accord-
ing to (18). Compared to the other schemes, competition intensiﬁes because the
university oﬀering the smaller quality-fee diﬀerential loses all students. Tuition fee





qi − (qj − fj) − ε : fj > qj − (1 + α)qi + γq2
i − β(1 + θ)/2
{f : f ≥ qj − qi + fj} : fj ≤ qj − (1 + α)qi + γq2
i − β(1 + θ)/2
(31)
Whenever the per student rent is positive, each university has an incentive to set
the fee to surpass the competitor’s quality-fee diﬀerential.24 Otherwise, any fee that
attracts no students at all is a best response. As a consequence, these reaction
function render the number of stage 2 equilibria inﬁnite.
We dissolve this indeterminacy by assuming that the university with the lower
quality-fee diﬀerential sets a fee of at least γq2
i − αqi − β(1 + θ)/2. This can be
justiﬁed by a kind of trembling-hand argument: if some student enrolled erroneously
at an university charging a fee below that threshold, it would suﬀer from a negative





qi + (1 − α − γqj)qj − β
1+ θ




i − αqi − β
1+ θ





According to (32), income contingent loans allow the university with the higher
quality-fee diﬀerential to extract (almost) the whole surplus students enjoy from
24The domain of this part of the reaction function results from the compatibility of the respective
fee with the positivity constraint on the per student rent: fi + αqi − γq2
i + β(1 + θ)/2.20 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
selecting that institution instead of the other.25 Using (32) allows the formulation
of the stage 1 university target functions:
πi(qi,qj) =
(
(1 + α)qi − γq2
i − (qj − γq2
j) − ε : (1 + α)(qi − qj) > γ(q2
i − q2
j)




Maximising the upper entry of this expression yields qi = (1 + α)/(2γ), the quality
which equalises the marginal cost and the marginal surplus extracted from students.
However, as the respective fee must be low enough to attract students, the per
student rent is non-negative only if the other university sets a quality of at most




γ, where ¯ q results from πi(1 + α
2γ , ¯ q) = 0. For a higher quality of the
rival j, university i is indiﬀerent between attracting one half of the students and
spending all fees on teaching, or attracting no students at all by setting qi < qj.
Hence, stage 1 reaction functions are:
qi(qj) =
( 1 + α
2γ : qj ≤ ¯ q
q ∈ [0,qj] : qj > ¯ q
. (34)
As a consequence, any symmetric solution with q > ¯ q is an equilibrium. However,
since ε is very small, qIC = (1+α)/(2γ) is a good approximation for the lower bound
of teaching qualities under income contingent loans.
Proposition 7. Under income contingent loans and university autonomy, both
universities oﬀer ineﬃciently high teaching qualities. No fee revenues are diverted
towards research.
Income contingent loans reward the university oﬀering the higher quality-fee dif-
ferential with the aggregate tuition revenue. This creates another Bertrand-like
situation with uniform equilibrium qualities and no diversion. However, the tuition
revenue received by universities is too high from a social perspective because it en-
compasses the taxpayers’ compensation for failing students. Hence, universities do
not take the true social cost of quality improvement into account.26
25In algebraic terms, university i attracts all students when it has a lower minimum fee: γq2
i −
αqi −β(1+ θ)/2 < γq2
j −αqj −β(1+ θ)/2. This is equivalent to (1+α−γqi)qi < (1+α−γqj)qj
which can be rearranged as (1 + α)(qi − qj) < γ(q2
i − q2
j).
26In the light of this ineﬃciency, it would be interesting to investigate to what extent the perfor-
mance of income contingent loans could be improved by assigning the losses arising from student
failure to the respective university.University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 21
The comparison of income contingent loans for qIC =
(1+α)
2γ with other reform options
gives:
Proposition 8. Income contingent loans with autonomous universities implicate
a lower total surplus than optimal uniform grants. Moreover, the surplus is lower
than with pure loans unless peer group eﬀects are suﬃciently high.
Proof. Follows from: SIC − SSC = −(1 − θ
2)/(16γ) < 0 and SIC − SPL =
β2γ(1− θ)/24−(1− θ
2)/64γ, which is positive if and only if β >
p
3/8·(1− θ)/γ .
The inferiority of income contingent loans relative to uniform grants originates in the
massive overinvestment in low ability students: qIC > qFC > q∗
2. An equal argument
applies to the comparison with pure loans: qIC > qPL
2 , whereas qIC ≷ qPL
1 ⇐⇒
4βγ ≷ 1− θ. However, as pure loan qualities decrease in β, income contingent loans
bring about higher welfare when the peer group eﬀect is suﬃciently strong.
6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated how the reform of higher education funding can aﬀect
university competition and hence the quality of tertiary education. Since it argues
that optimality can be achieved by a properly administered graduate tax and that
university autonomy leads to either too high or too diverse qualities, the analysis
makes a general case for some government involvement in the fee setting process.
However, this recommendation is subject to the well-known caveat that state au-
thorities pursue socially optimal policies. Otherwise, full or restricted autonomy by
imposing fee ceilings like in the UK might yield a better solution.
As it stands, this simple analysis has neglected a number of interesting aspects. First,
we have taken the admission standard as exogenous and equal in all settings which
deprives the government of an instrument to make up for some problems of university
choices. However, allowing for standard adjustments would not aﬀect our surplus
results: Since these ﬁndings obtain for arbitrary standards, they continue to hold
when schemes are evaluated at the respective optimal admission levels. Second, we
have focussed on educational funding, identifying university autonomy as the right
to set tuition fees. Much of the existing literature on higher education competition
stresses admission standard aspects instead (Epple et al., 2003, De Fraja and Iossa,
2002). In our model, admission is controlled only indirectly by the fee policy.22 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
Space restrictions preclude an integrated analysis of both admission and fee au-
tonomy. However, useful insights can be gained by the analysis in Eisenkopf (2004)
which suggests that admission autonomy reinforces the incentives for diﬀerentiation.
One may therefore conjecture that providing universities with an additional tool to
exert market power would not be beneﬁcial for eﬃciency.27
Third, we have considered success probabilities as exogenous. Alternatively, one
can argue that the risk of failure rises with the complicacy of the study (Eisenkopf,
2004) and/or is inﬂuenced by the average ability in class. Meier (2004) has shown
that the latter interrelation makes the welfare comparison between diﬀerentiation
and uniformity ambiguous. This would aﬀect, but not vitiate our Proposition 1.
In particular, when diﬀerentiation remains optimal in such an extended framework,
our ﬁndings remain valid, because the superiority of the graduate tax in terms of
the number of instruments and the distortion of incentives under fee autonomy
still apply. If uniformity was optimal instead, the surplus would be maximised by
respective uniform fees or grants combined with free enrolment choice. Nevertheless,
university autonomy would still be undesirable.
Another interesting extension would be to allow students to care for both teaching
and research, the latter indicating the reputation of the university. In a respec-
tive model, Warning (2006) ﬁnds that universities diﬀerentiate maximally in one
attribute and are homogenous in the other even with student grants. Whether dif-
ferentiation occurs with respect to teaching or research, depends on the diversity of
quality intervals. However, the concept of strategic groups advanced by Warning
(2006) is likely to lead to low teaching diﬀerentiation when grants (or fees) are uni-
form. This is in line with the ﬁndings of this paper. The analysis of welfare issues
or the eﬀects of the various fee proposals considered here along these lines - not
conducted by Warning (2006) - are promising topics for further research.
Despite these limitations, it is informative to relate our results to the existing liter-
ature. In a setting where individuals diﬀer in ﬁnancial wealth, Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and
W¨ alde (2000) ﬁnd the pure loan scheme to be dominated by the other options, with
a tendency of the graduate tax to outperform income contingent loans. Focussing
on ability diﬀerences, Del Rey and Racionero (2006) conclude that both pure loans
and graduate taxes lead to eﬃcient total enrolment when individuals are risk neu-
27Some support for this claim is provided by Epple and Romano (1998) where schools price
discriminate according to ability and eﬃciency results only from free market entry and exit.University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 23
tral. However, both models studies endogenous total attendance at institutions with
ﬁxed quality, whereas our contribution has variable quality but an exogenous over-
all number of students. Interestingly, the eﬃciency ranking of the alternatives need
not be aﬀected by this structural modelling diﬀerence: In our setting, a properly
designed graduate tax is optimal as well. This suggests that the graduate tax is an
adequate tool to control both teaching quality competition as well as student access.
Ideally, this statement should be validated in a fully ﬂedged model of educational
reform with variable quality and total attendance. Due to space restrictions, we
brieﬂy report on the ramiﬁcations of such an extended setup.
With variable enrolment, the central assignment equilibrium would depart from
optimality in two respects. On the one hand, the lacking price signal for students
would induce too many students - that is, students with ineﬃciently low ability - to
study, on the other hand, the poor teaching quality would discourage from going to
university. Therefore, the total number of students under central assignment could
either exceed or fall short of optimal enrolment. However, the competition created
from allowing students to select among institutions would improve quality and the
total number of students. Hence, the ineﬃciency problem of public higher education
could even be aggravated by such a measure.
Tuition fees drive a wedge between the income from going to university or not and
can therefore address this ineﬃciency. In particular, the above equivalence between
grants and fees would be broken. As shown by Del Rey and Racionero (2006), both
pure loans and the graduate tax give eﬃcient signals to prospective students. This
suggests that an extended version of the graduate tax can achieve optimality, with
the fee for the low quality university not only setting proper incentives for quality
provision, but also for enrolment. As these two tasks are likely to conﬂict, the
amount university 2 should receive may diﬀer from the amount its students should
pay. This makes an additional argument for government intervention and optimality
of university autonomy less likely.
The analysis of university autonomy with endogenous total enrolment has strong
similarities to the vertical product diﬀerentiation literature with variable total de-
mand. Unfortunately, this type of model features serious problems of tractability.
In a setup with endogenous total demand and costless quality, Wauthy (1996) has
shown that the exogenous total demand equilibrium results when the heterogeneity24 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
of customers is low. Otherwise, only a part of the market is covered and the low
quality ﬁrm chooses a higher quality than in the fully covered case.
In our context, this implies that the results still hold for endogenous total atten-
dance, provided that the admission standard is suﬃciently strict and teaching is
not too costly. When these conditions are not met, the quality diﬀerences between
universities is likely to be lower than reported above. Intuitively, the incentives for
university 2 to lower its quality are mitigated as this makes not going to univer-
sity more attractive. Nevertheless, diﬀerentiation is still excessive.28 Therefore, fee
autonomy is unlikely to maximize the higher education surplus also in this richer
setting.
28The optimal solution in Wauthy (1996) would be both ﬁrms supplying the highest possible
quality.University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 25
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. We concentrate on diﬀerentiated fees f1 > f2 straight-
away because the impossibility of achieving eﬃciency by uniform fees has been
established in the main text.
For both pure loans and the graduate tax, the quality response functions for each
university are given implicitly by the ﬁrst-order conditions:
(α − 2γqi + β
∂¯ θi
∂qi
)Ni + (fi + αqi − γq
2




where both Ni and ¯ θi are dependent on the ﬁnancing scheme. Combining these
























































(1 + θ)/2) only if βγ =
1+ θ2
2(1+ θ) which violates the assumption on β. However, even
if β assumed that value, eﬃciency would result by chance and not because of the
structural features of the pure loan scheme.









2 − 2βγ(1 + θ)
(1 + θ)2 + 1 + θ
2 − 2βγ(1 + θ)
, (37)
which is positive, but less than unity. Thus, the superiority of the graduate tax
relative to pure loans grounds in the availability of an additional instrument to
inﬂuence enrolment decisions without compromising quality choices.





B + (fi + αqi − γq2
i + β¯ θi)(1 − θ) : qi > qj + (fi − fj)
B + (fi + αqi − γq2
i + β¯ θi)(1 − θ)/2 : qi = qj + (fi − fj)
B : qi < qj + (fi − fj)
, (38)26 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
leading to the quality reaction functions:
qi(qj) =

    
    
α/(2γ) : qj < α/(2γ) − (fi − fj)
qj − (fi − fj) + ε : α/(2γ) − (fi − fj) ≤ qj < ˆ q(fi, ¯ θi) − (fi − fj)
q ≤ ˆ q(fi, ¯ θi) : qj = ˆ q(fi, ¯ θi) − (fi − fj)
q < qj − (fi − fj) : qj > ˆ q(fi, ¯ θi) − (fi − fj)
,
(39)
where ˆ q(fi, ¯ θi) is given by (13), with fi replacing the uniform grant t. Thus, whenever
the rent is positive q < ˆ q(fi, ¯ θi), each university has an incentive to provide a slightly
higher quality than the competitor. Thus, whenever ˆ q(fi, ¯ θi) − (fi − fj) > ˆ q(fj, ¯ θj),
university i crowds out university j and attracts all students. This cannot be optimal
because then all students get the same quality.
In any equilibrium with quality diﬀerentiation:
ˆ q(fi, ¯ θi) − (fi − fj) = ˆ q(fj, ¯ θj) (40)
must hold. However, then all students are indiﬀerent between both institutions.
Random matching leads to ¯ θi = ¯ θj = (1 + θ)/2, which violates eﬃcient sorting.
But even if students sorted according to ability for whatever reason (¯ θ1 = (1 +
θ∗)/2, ¯ θ2 = (θ∗ + θ)/2), income contingent loans miss eﬃciency except in a single
case. Eﬃcient quality choices require ˆ q(f∗
1,(1+θ∗)/2) = q∗
1 and ˆ q(f∗
2,(θ∗ + θ)/2) =
q∗










β(1 − 2 θ)
2
. (41)
But from (40), this expression equals q∗
1−q∗
2 only if β = (1− θ)2/(4γ(2 θ−1)) by co-
incidence. Otherwise, the eﬃcient solution cannot be implemented as an equilibrium
under income contingent loans. 











The diﬀerence in individual net earnings is:
θ(q
PL
i − α/(2γ)) − (f
PL
i − α
2(1 − θ)/(4γ)). (43)University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality 27
from which one can derive the ability of the student who is indiﬀerent between
both schemes. Doing so is rather cumbersome and reveals no deeper insights than
presenting examples where all students are worse oﬀ under pure loans. When α =
β = 0, (43) is negative for all students with a success probability below (49−58 θ+
25 θ
2)/(40−8 θ). This level is lower than unity only if θ < 1/5 and exceeds θ if and
only if θ < 7/11. Thus, all students are better oﬀ under pure loans when student
heterogeneity is suﬃciently low. When α = 1,β = 0, the threshold ability to be
better oﬀ under pure loans becomes (81−42 θ+25 θ
2)/(72−8 θ) ≷ 1 ⇐⇒ θ ≶ 0.36.
When α = 1,β = 1/(4γ), the critical ability becomes (232 − 156 θ + 51 θ
2)/(192 −
24 θ) ≷ 1 ⇐⇒ θ ≶ 0.3504. This level is higher than θ, if and only if θ < 0.8070.
28 University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality
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